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Leverage and Reinsurance Effects on Loss Reserves in the United Kingdom's (UK) Property-
Casualty Insurance Industry 
Abstract 
We examine the relation between loss reserving errors, leverage and reinsurance in the UK's 
property-casualty insurance industry. We find that financially weak insurers under-estimate 
reserves to reduce leverage, and so pre-empt costly regulatory scrutiny. However, at very high 
leverage, insurers over-reserve, suggesting a non-linear relation between leverage and reserving 
policy. We also investigate whether monitoring by reinsurers reduces reserving errors, and find that 
highly reinsured insurers are less likely to make loss reserve errors. However, the use of proportional 
reinsurance does not affect loss reserve accuracy. 
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1.  Introduction 
 In this study, we investigate the effects of UK property-casualty insurers' solvency (leverage) 
and risk management (reinsurance) practices on accounting accruals adjustments on insurance loss 
reserves.  The loss reserve is the largest balance sheet item for insurance firms and derives from an 
actuarial estimate of an insurer's liability for unpaid claims (plus associated loss adjustment, legal 
and other expenses) on incurred (but not necessarily fully reported) losses - usually over the 
previous five accident years (Grace and Leverty, 2010, 2012). Measures of loss reserve errors 
therefore reflect accounting differences between the forecast and actual claims outcomes payable 
under insurance contracts (Nelson, 2000).   
The UK's property-casualty insurance industry is an interesting setting for conducting 
accounting accruals-based earnings management research. First, statutory accounting data are 
publicly available thus enabling managerial bias in loss reserving, and its link with solvency and risk 
management to be examined (Weiss, 1985). Second, there are costs for insurance firms associated 
with the discretionary manipulation of earnings via loss reserves, which in extreme cases could 
result in regulatory receivership (Hoyt and McCullough, 2010). Third, in writing generally non-
tradable contingent financial claims contracts, insurers, like banks, are more highly leveraged than 
most other commercial entities (Harrington and Niehaus, 2003). This makes the maintenance of 
solvency, loss reserve accuracy, and risk management important strategic issues for property-
casualty insurers and other financial firms.  Such considerations  have spawned a large number of 
studies examining the impact of loss reserve accruals on reported  earnings, solvency reporting, and 
firm valuation – most notably in the United States (US) property-casualty insurance industry (e.g., 
see Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; Eckles and Halek, 2010).  
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Regulatory and other institutional (e.g., accounting and fiscal) differences between the US and 
other insurance markets, such as the UK, could influence corporate financial reporting decisions in 
different ways. One example of accounting treatment differences between jurisdictions concerns 
the use of reserve discounting. Statutory insurance accounting rules in the US prohibited the 
discounting of loss reserves, whereas in the UK and other countries (e.g., Australia), insurance 
regulations have allowed a degree of reserve discounting, especially for long-tail insurance contracts 
(e.g., legal liability), where claims settlements can extend over several years (D'Arcy, Au and Zhang, 
2009).Transnational regulatory and accounting differences could therefore affect the discretion 
insurance managers have in manipulating loss liabilities (e.g., through the choice of discount rates) 
and meeting other strategic (e.g., earnings) targets. Indeed, the greater degree of managerial 
discretion over reserve discounting in the UK could, all else equal, increase the propensity for loss 
reserve errors, and hence, weaken corporate solvency compared with the US.  
 Our study has two key goals. First, we examine the relation between UK insurers’ leverage 
and loss reserve accruals. Leverage management motives for loss reserving have political as well as 
economic importance for insurance firms as they are subject to ongoing statutory solvency 
monitoring and prudential controls by industry regulators (Serafeim,2011). Specifically, we examine 
the linear and the non-linear effects of leverage on the accuracy of loss reserves given that prior 
research (e.g., Purnanandam, 2008) suggests a non-linear relation between leverage and risk 
hedging. Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) add that in financial services, there is often a direct link 
between loss reserve accruals and capital requirements - a factor that heightens the regulatory 
significance of research such as ours.  
Second, we examine whether reinsurance and the monitoring function of reinsurers influence 
the accuracy of loss reserves.  Adiel (1996) notes that reinsurance creates opportunities for 
managers to meet statutory solvency requirements, and other strategic objectives. However, the 
linkage between the type of reinsurance used (e.g., proportional and non-proportional treaties) and 
reserving errors has not been examined previously. This relation is important from both commercial 
and regulatory perspectives given that strategic decisions regarding the form and mix of reinsurance 
purchased can directly influence levels of reserves and the reported solvency positions of insurance 
firms (Eden and Kahane, 1988). Therefore, the present study adds to the literature on financial 
contracting, risk management, and their links with corporate accounting and financial reporting 
practices. 
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 The current study makes four contributions. First, we observe that financially weak insurers 
under-state reserves in order to reduce reported claims liabilities (leverage) and enhance their 
accounting position. These results accord with many prior US-based studies (e.g.,Petroni, 1992; 
Gaver and Paterson, 2004; Grace and Leverty 2010). For the first time, we also find that when 
insurers’ leverage is 'very high' (i.e., where the ratio of claims liabilities to total assets is around 
90%), insurers over-reserve for future liabilities1. Indeed, under statutory powers granted under 
sections 138 and 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) (2000), the UK's insurance 
industry regulator can actively require financially weak (low income) insurers to raise additional 
capital and/or reserves. 
Second, we find that the amount of reinsurance purchased by UK insurers reduces reserving 
errors. We argue that this is because reinsurance enables primary insurers to effectively hedge 
underwriting risks and lower levels of reserves (Abdul Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 2010). 
Reinsurance also allows insurers to benefit from the oversight and risk management advice 
provided by their reinsurer partners (Plantin, 2006). However, insurers' use of proportional 
reinsurance does not significantly affect the accuracy of loss reserves. 
Third, our UK study adds to prior (mainly US) research by showing that the managers of 
insurance firms behave differently (e.g., in terms of their risk management practices) as a 
consequence of the nature of the regulatory regime under which they operate. This condition could 
apply equally to the reserving practices of other financial firms such as banks and life insurers. 
Fourth, our use of a dynamic panel data design - System Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM-SYS) - controls for contemporaneous correlation and other issues (e.g., simultaneity  
between reserving and reinsurance) as well as time-specific factors, notably underwriting cycles, 
that might affect loss reserves as a result of temporal changes in market premiums, earnings 
performance, and levels of capital2. These aspects of our research design advance on prior research 
and enhance the robustness of our results.  
 The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of 
the main regulatory differences between UK and US property-casualty insurance markets. In section 
3, we motivate and formulate our research hypotheses. In section 4, we describe our sources of 
data, specify the modeling procedure, and describe the variables used. Section 5 then presents the 
empirical results, while section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Comparison of UK and US Insurance regulation  
 Before 2000, the UK statutory accounting framework for insurers was governed by various 
insurance company statutes - notably the 1994 Insurance Companies Regulations, which monitored 
solvency on a regulatory test-ratio basis similar to the pre-1994 solvency surveillance system in the 
US (e.g., see Hoyt and McCullough, 2010). However, after the passage of FSMA (2000), and in the 
wake of high profile under-reserving induced insolvencies of property-casualty insurers, such as 
Independent Insurance plc (2001) in the UK and the HIH insurance Group (2001) in Australia, the UK 
adopted a more proactive and holistic 'individual risk-based capital assessment' for all licensed 
insurance firms.  This firm-level risk-based regulatory approach in the UK assesses an insurer's 
'probability of ruin' not only in terms of quantitative financial criteria, such as leverage and liquidity, 
but also qualitative aspects, such as the risks associated with boardroom strategies. This approach 
was fully formalised in 2003/4 by the pre-2013 unitary regulatory authority - the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) (Eling and Holzmüller, 2008).3  
Unlike their UK counterparts, the accounting treatments and financial reporting practices of 
US publicly listed insurance firms are also subject to potential enforcement actions of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) (Hart, 2009). Therefore, 
regulatory differences in the reserving for insurance losses could influence the financial decisions of 
UK insurance managers in distinct ways compared with their counterparts in the US. Indeed, giving 
UK insurance managers regulatory discretion as to which insurance liabilities to discount, and in 
setting discount rate assumptions (e.g., on future inflation and interest rates) could, as we noted 
earlier, lead them to estimate the direction and scale of loss reserve errors differently compared 
with their US counterparts4.   
The UK's system of unregulated premium rating could further impact on how insurers build 
reserves in ways that are dissimilar from the US where regulatory limits of premiums is common in 
many states (e.g., New York state). For example, unregulated insurance premium rating allows 
insurers to adjust premiums to 'actuarially fairly' reflect the exposure of risks underwritten and 
other market (e.g., investment) conditions pertaining at the time business is written. This could 
enable UK insurers to more accurately estimate reserves, reduce reserving errors, and so better 
protect insurers' solvency position compared with US insurers operating in premium regulated 
environments, such as New York state. Cole and McCullough (2006) also note that in the US, 
regulations discriminate between domestic US reinsurers and foreign (‘alien’) reinsurance 
companies by prescribing that US primary insurers maintain higher capital ratios ('collateralization') 
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if they reinsure with an unauthorised foreign reinsurer compared with a US reinsurer. Therefore, all 
else equal, financially weak US primary insurers reinsuring with unauthorised foreign reinsurers are 
expected to have a relatively high incidence of under-reserving error, and thus, more likely to 
engage in earnings management (Petroni,1992). In contrast, the UK’s insurance regulations do not 
discriminate between domiciled and non-domiciled reinsurance suppliers. This means that in the 
UK, insurers are prospectively better able than their US counterparts to cost-effectively manage 
their solvency position using an optimal mix of reserving and reinsurance strategies. This aspect of 
the UK's 'lighter touch' insurance regulatory environment further provides for a potentially direct 
test of the reinsurance-reserving relation.  
3. Hypotheses  
 In this section, we outline two alternative hypotheses (H1A and H1B) regarding the relation 
between leverage and the direction/scale of loss reserving errors, and then consider the expected 
contingent capital effects of risk reinsurance on the level of loss reserves (H2) and their accuracy 
(H3 and H4). 
3.1.  Effect of leverage on loss reserving errors 
 Cummins and Sommer (1996) acknowledge that insurers’ profitability directly affects 
solvency, and that increased financial distress/bankruptcy risk lowers the market demand for 
insurance in the face of limited government guarantee funds. As noted earlier, several US studies 
(e.g., Petroni, 1992; Beaver, McNichols and Nelson, 2003; Gaver and Paterson, 2004) document that 
managers in financially troubled insurers use discretionary accruals to under-state loss reserves in 
order to reduce reported loss liabilities (i.e., improve solvency). Such action allows insurers to avoid 
not only the disruption costs of regulatory scrutiny, but also the associated economic loss of a drop 
in new business premiums due to the perceived enhanced risk of financial distress/bankruptcy 
amongst policyholders. Therefore, the more discretion given by UK regulators to insurance 
managers over the assumptions and rates used to discount reserves (e.g., with respect to losses on 
long-tail lines of insurance), the greater the scope for reserve under-statement. The release of funds 
from under-stating reserves can be further used to improve accounting period profitability (and so 
help managers meet bonus targets) and/or increase dividends to shareholders, thereby, promoting 
firm value (Eckles, Halek and Zhang, 2014). Such incentives are consistent with the motives for 
earnings management not only in financial firms, but also for firms operating in other industries 
(e.g., see Atieh and Hussain, 2012). Therefore: 
 H1A: Highly leveraged property-casualty insurers (linearly) under-state loss reserves.  
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Research acknowledges that determining the optimality of solvency (leverage), and risk 
management (reinsurance) is a complex phenomenon that could have a non-linear (non-monotonic) 
effect on accounting numbers. For example, Purnanandam (2008) argues that financial distress 
costs associated with increased leverage can motivate firms to engage in risk management. 
However, the incentives to hedge risks dissipate at extreme levels of leverage as the 'default put 
option' of shareholders' equity under limited liability rules becomes more valuable. This implies that 
insurance firms that gain the most from reserve accruals management may neither be the most 
financially weak nor the most financial strong operators in the industry, suggesting a non-monotonic 
(non-linear) relation between leverage and loss reserving errors.  Under statutory powers granted 
under sections 138 and 166 of the FSMA (2000), the UK's insurance industry regulator can require 
financially weak insurers to review their commercial practices, and if necessary, raise equity and/or 
set aside deficiency reserves in cases where unexpired risks are deemed to have been under-priced 
(e.g., in order to maintain product-market share) and/or where investment returns are lower than 
expected (e.g., due to unforeseen macroeconomic conditions).5 Regulatory pressure for financially 
fragile UK property-casualty insurers to maintain  'safety' reserve margins to offset unexpectedly 
severe  losses is particularly likely to be needed in liability and catastrophe insurance lines where 
the quantum and timing of incurred, but not reported (IBNR) claims are often difficult to accurately 
estimate ex-ante (Zanjani, 2002). This implies that UK insurers in acutely weak financial condition 
will be unable to continuously under-reserve their liabilities in order to improve their leverage 
position as pressure from the industry regulator - particularly in a unitary regulatory environment 
such as the UK - would lead to them to over-reserve in a non-linear manner. As a result: 
 H1B: Highly leveraged property-casualty insurers (non-linearly) over-state loss reserves.  
 An argument relevant to understanding the loss reserving-solvency risk relation, particularly 
in terms of the role of reinsurance, is provided by Harrington and Danzon’s (1994) ‘moral hazard' 
hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that due to the ‘default put option’ feature of corporate limited 
liability and the existence of government policyholders' guarantee funds (as exists in the UK), the 
managers of highly leveraged insurers could be motivated to increase levels of reinsurance not only 
to reduce underwriting and insolvency risks, but also to increase rates of new business (positive 
cash flow). In this way, purchasing reinsurance substitutes for capital and reserves, thereby, 
allowing managers to release funds (reduce leverage/increase earnings) to satisfy other objectives, 
such as the meeting of new sales and/or executive bonus plan targets. Increasing reinsurance can 
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also protect policyholders and other constituents (e.g., minority shareholders) from agency 
problems, such as the underinvestment incentive (e.g., see Garven and MacMinn, 1993).6 
Therefore, increasing reinsurance can strengthen insurers' balance sheets by reducing reported 
liabilities (reserves) and improve reported earnings.  As a consequence: 
 H2: Highly leveraged property-casualty insurers with high rates of new business growth 
 increase reinsurance to reduce loss reserves.  
3.2.   Effect of reinsurance on the accuracy of loss reserves 
 Although the transaction costs of reinsurance reduce the free cash flows of insurance firms  
(Shiu, 2011), it nevertheless helps managers smooth period earnings, and therefore, potentially 
reduces the need for earnings management (Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003). Reinsurance 
enables primary insurers to retain smaller risk exposures and reinsure larger ones, thereby, reducing 
their future claims' liabilities (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). Monitoring by reinsurers of primary insurers' 
business activities can also play an important role in alleviating information asymmetry problems in 
insurance markets (Plantin, 2006). As such, reinsurers can usefully complement regulatory oversight 
- an important attribute in 'light touch' regulatory regimes, such as the UK's insurance market. For 
example, reinsurers will closely monitor the underwriting and claims settlement practices of primary 
insurers, and if necessary, adjust ex-post reinsurance commissions (which they pay an insurer) and 
reinsurance premiums (which they charge an insurer) in the event of greater than anticipated loss 
experience by the primary insurer (Jean-Baptiste and Santomero, 2000). Plantin’s (2006) notion of 
the ‘credible signaling’ benefit of reinsurance further implies that highly reinsured insurers are likely 
to be subject to a greater degree of oversight by reinsurance managers, and thus, have lower 
reserve errors than less reinsured insurance firms. Accordingly: 
 H3: Highly reinsured property-casualty insurers report more accurate loss reserves. 
 Eden and Kahane (1988) argue that the form of reinsurance treaty used can also affect the 
risk and capital management decisions of insurance firms. Under proportional reinsurance (e.g., a 
quota-share treaty), the insurer and reinsurer share premiums and losses proportionally. 
Proportional reinsurance spreads the risk of loss and creates a ‘broad identity’ of financial interests 
between the insurer and reinsurer. As such, the reinsurer is able to acquire information on the 
adequacy of the insurer’s capital, reserves and risk management systems, and therefore, act as an 
effective monitor of an insurer’s underwriting and other operations. In contrast, under non-
proportional reinsurance (e.g., an excess-of-loss treaty), the reinsurer does not participate in every 
8 
 
loss event. If losses to the insurer are less than the retention specified in the reinsurance treat, then 
the reinsurer owes nothing to the primary insurer. Therefore, all else equal, an insurer does not 
need to disclose as much risk analysis data and other business information under non-proportional 
reinsurance compared with proportional reinsurance. As a result of potentially high information 
asymmetries associated with non-proportional reinsurance, a reinsurer is likely to become a 
relatively less effective monitor of an insurer’s business operations than in cases where proportional 
reinsurance is used (Eden and Kahane, 1988).7 Thus: 
 H4: Property-casualty insurers that predominantly use proportional reinsurance report 
 more accurate loss reserves. 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Sampling procedure 
 Standard & Poor’s SynThesys UK non-life insurers' database was used to derive our panel 
sample. This database provides details on the annual solvency returns submitted to the regulator 
by UK-licensed insurance firms (which for the purpose of the present study was the period from 
1985 (the first year of data) to 2010 (the latest year available to us at the time the study was carried 
out)). The unbalanced panel data set that we use covers firms licensed to write insurance in the UK. 
Regulatory returns are also filed separately for each trading entity within conglomerate insurance 
groups. Before 1996, UK property-casualty insurers were only required to disclose their loss 
development history for the previous five accident years. More recent actuarial reserve estimation 
techniques usually require a five to nine-year resolution period to estimate Incurred/Developed 
Losses at t+5 (Grace and Leverty, 2012). This reduced the reserve error sampling period from 1991 
to 2005. There were also mergers and acquisitions (particularly during the late 1990s) and intra-
company restructurings in the UK’s property-casualty insurance industry, which could affect 
reported financial data. Therefore, we applied the following conditions in the sampling procedure 
in order to conduct our analysis. First, missing values for any of the variables used in the models 
preclude an insurer from being included in the sample. Second, insurers must have positive 
reserves, incurred losses, total assets, and gross premium written as well as at least three 
consecutive years of complete data. This results in an unbalanced dataset of 1,386 firm/year cases 
covering 151 UK property-casualty insurers. The panel sample comprises approximately 50% of the 
population of active UK-based property-casualty insurers over the period of analysis. Of these firms, 
approximately 95% are stock insurers. This precludes a separate analysis of loss reserving 
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differences between the stock and mutual forms of insurance organization that has been carried in 
some prior US research (e.g., Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993). Otherwise, the final panel data set 
includes a representative mix of insurers of different size, product-mix, and stock ownership 
structure, which account for roughly 70% of gross annual premiums and about 80% of the value of 
total assets in the UK's property-casualty insurance sector over the period of analysis. 
4.2. Loss reserve error proxies 
 Ideally, reserve errors are measured by taking the difference of the originally obtained 
reserve (i.e., outstanding claims + IBNR) losses) and the fully developed reserve (i.e., the sum of all 
claim payments associated with that reserve). However, this estimation procedure is often 
impractical because of the lack of complete and accurate loss development data (Grace and Leverty, 
2010, 2012). Accordingly, prior studies employ one of two main methods for calculating reserve 
errors. The Weiss (1985) method is the difference between the estimated incurred value of losses 
reported in yeart (including IBNR), and the cumulative actual amount of loss development settled 
in the future accounting period yeart+n. That is: 
 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝑛. 
   
(1) 
The KFS approach is the difference between the estimated value of incurred losses reported in yeart 
(including IBNR), and a re-estimate of these incurred losses given n years of loss development (e.g., 
in yeart+n) (Kazenski, Feldhaus, and Schneider, 1992), namely: 
 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝑛. 
(2) 
 In estimating reserve errors, it is desirable for n to be as large as possible (Petroni, 1992). UK 
regulatory filings require property-casualty insurers to disclose, for the current and nine preceding 
loss development years, the original reserve, the reserve as re-estimated in each following year, and 
the cumulative amount paid against the reserve in each subsequent year. Thus, the largest possible 
n is nine years. Although ‘large’ n generally results in more accurate loss reserves, it can nevertheless 
significantly reduce the final dataset (by the latest nine years). Therefore, the objective is to choose 
n that is sufficient to detect statistically significant reserve errors within a sample of insurers without 
unduly limiting the sample size. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), we use the five most recent 
accident years ( t-4, …, t) to estimate the incurred losses (Incurred Lossesi,t) for  KFS and Weiss errors. 
The five most recent accident years capture the greater part of calendar year reserves, with loss 
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reserves for years t-5 to t-9 generally forming a small part of total reserves. In addition, a five years' 
period for unexpired risks is used to examine the magnitude of loss reserving errors (Incurred 
Lossesi,t+5 and Developed Losses Paidi,t+5).  
4.3.  Modeling procedure 
 To test the relation between leverage and the direction (sign) of loss reserving errors (H1A 
and H1B), we first estimate fixed-effects logistic regressions of the general form:  
 𝑙𝑛
𝜋𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
(3) 
where subscript i denotes ith insurer (i = 1, … , 151) and subscript t denotes the tth year (t = 1991, … 
, 2005). ln(𝜋𝑖𝑡/1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑡) is the logit dependent variable representing (KFS/Weiss) loss reserve errors. 
To test the likelihood of under-reserving in highly levered insurance firms, as predicted by  H1A, the 
dependent variable in equation (3) takes the value of 1 if the error is under-reserved (negative), and 
0 otherwise; Incentives is a vector of the main explanatory variables (i.e., leverage, reinsurance, 
growth, proportional reinsurance, and derivatives plus relevant interactions); and  Controls is a 
vector of firm-specific variables that could affect insurers' reserving decisions (i.e., return on assets 
(plus its standard deviation), tax shield, product mix, group membership, public listing, age and firm 
size). All the variables that enter our analysis are defined and briefly motivated in section 4.4 below. 
The disturbance term in equation (3) is specified as a two-way error component model of the form: 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   (4) 
where 𝜇𝑖 denotes an insurer-specific effects, λt denotes year-specific effects and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
remaining disturbance. The results from estimating equation (3) are reported in Tables 3 and 4, and 
examined in section 5.2. 
 Second, to investigate the empirical relation between leverage and the level of over/under 
reserve errors, including the conjoint-effect of reinsurance and premium growth (H2), we first 
estimate the following model: 
 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (5) 
where Errorit represents our dependent variables (KFS or Weiss errors) scaled by total assets. The 
vectors of Incentives and Controls consist of those explanatory variables noted above with reference 
to equation (3). However, reserve errors in a given period could be influenced by the previous year’s 
reserving decisions thereby creating a potential endogeneity issue with regard to persistency in the 
dependent variable, Errorit. Accordingly, and as recommended in Arellano and Bond (1991), the 
GMM estimator can be employed with a single-period lagged dependent variable (Errori, t-1) entering 
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the analysis as an explanatory variable that is correlated with μi.  To mitigate potential bias, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) also propose that to control for unobserved firm-level influences (e.g., different in 
risk management expertise) firm-specific fixed-effects are eliminated by taking the first-difference 
of equation (5). That is: 
 
∆𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑∆𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
 
(6) 
where, 
 
∆𝑢𝑖𝑡 = (𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖) + (𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡−1) + (𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1). 
∆𝑢𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝜆𝑡 + ∆𝜈𝑖𝑡. 
(7) 
Though fixed-effects (μi) are eliminated by first-differencing, Errori,t-1 is still potentially 
endogenous as Errori,t-1 in ∆𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 is correlated with 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1in ∆𝜈𝑖𝑡 =
𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1. However, this can be resolved using lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels 
as instruments in the difference equation (Hsiao,2003). For example, valid instruments for 
(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2) are the lagged levels 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2, 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−3, … , 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗, as 
𝐸[𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗(𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1)] = 0, as long as 𝑗 ≥ 2 and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 are not serially correlated. Two additional 
problems can nonetheless arise from estimating equation (5) by differencing. First, the ‘cross-
insurer’ dimension of the data is lost because it does not vary with time. Second, if the dependent 
variable in equation (5) is persistent over time, then the lagged value is a potentially weak 
instrument for the differenced equation, thereby, producing biased estimates (Baltagi,2005). 
Therefore,  we use the GMM-SYS method of Arellano and Bover (1995), with a 'collapsed matrix' of 
lagged instruments as recommended in Roodman (2009), to estimate equation (6).  
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) note that in contrast to other panel data methods, such as 
two-stage least squares (2SLS), GMM-SYS does not rely on external instrumental variables, which 
are often difficult to identify and justify in accounting and finance research. GMM-SYS also assumes 
that omitted variables are time-invariant (which is likely in short panels such as that employed in 
the present study). In addition, GMM-SYS allows indicator variables (e.g., Group and Public) to enter 
the analysis. Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) note that with GMM-SYS, instrument validity can be 
tested by the Sargan-Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions, which is asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(n) with n degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that selected instruments 
ae valid. The Difference Sagan-Hansen test is used to check the exogeneity of the regressors, while 
the Arellano-Bond z-statistic can be used to test for first-order (AR1) and second-order (AR2) 
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autocorrelation in the residuals. First-order autocorrelation is not an important issue in first-
difference estimations, whereas second-order autocorrelation could affect the reliability of derived 
parameter estimates. In the present study, all diagnostic tests supported the null hypotheses, 
indicating that the results derived from the GMM-SYS procedure are reliable. The estimates derived 
from equation (6) are reported in Tables 5 and 6, and analysed in section 5.2. GMM-SYS diagnostics 
are also reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
 To test the effect of reinsurance on the accuracy of loss reserves as predicted by H3 and H4, 
we employ equation (8) below to separate the frequency distribution of positive and negative 
errors:   
 
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1) 
+𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟-– 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡(𝛽𝑂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟– -𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡(𝛽𝑈𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
 
(8) 
where Abs(Errorit) is the absolute value of the KFS or Weiss loss reserve error estimates, scaled 
by total assets. Over-Reserve and Under-Reserve are dummy variables, indicating the direction of 
the error (e.g., Over-Reserve is equal to 1 and Under-Reserve is equal to 0 if reserve-error is positive). 
Subscripts O/U denote coefficient estimates if reserve-errors are positive/negative. The vectors of 
explanatory variables classified as Incentives and Controls are as noted previously. The results from 
estimating equation (8) using the GMM-SYS estimator are reported in Tables 7 and 8 (together with 
the GMM-SYS diagnostics), and again evaluated in section 5.2 below. 
4.4.  Variable definitions 
4.4.1.   Main explanatory variables 
 Leverage (Solvency): The introduction of 'individual risk-based capital assessment' in the UK 
following the FSMA (2000), precluded the use of regulatory-based solvency thresholds to motivate 
insurers' ex-ante loss reserving practices as noted in earlier US studies, such as Petroni (1992) and 
Beaver et al. (2003). To approximate an insurer’s leverage (solvency) risk, and assess its impact on 
loss reserves (H1A and H1B), we follow Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013) and use the standard regulatory 
leverage ratio: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(1)𝑖,𝑡 = 1 −
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
, (9) 
where Surplus is the sum of capital and shareholders' funds and Total Assets are tangible fixed and 
current (so-called 'admissible') assets of an insurer that are used by the UK insurance industry 
regulator to assess annual statutory minimum levels of solvency. The larger Leverage(1), the greater 
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an insurer's insolvency risk. We also employ an alternative measure of insurers’ solvency risk – 
Leverage(2), namely, the ratio of net premium written to surplus at year-end (Eden and Kahane, 
1988). Leverage(2) measures the ability of insurer to absorb above-average losses; the greater an 
insurer’s leverage (insolvency risk), the higher the Leverage(2). To account for possible non-linear 
leverage effects on reserve errors, squared values of our leverage measures also enter the analysis.   
  Reinsurance: Highly reinsured insurers are likely to be subjected to tighter control and 
monitoring by their reinsurance partners (Plantin, 2006). Therefore, we predict that Reinsurance 
will have a negative relation with respect to the size of loss reserve errors (H3). As in Adiel (1996), 
the level of reinsurance is measured as: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡
. (10) 
 Growth: As in Grace and Leverty (2010), Growth is measured as the ratio of annual increase 
in net premiums written. We normalise the Reinsurance and Growth variables to reduce potential 
multicollinearity8. 
 Proportional Reinsurance: This is defined as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚  𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡
. (11) 
 Proportional reinsurance helps primary insurers minimize information asymmetries at the 
point of sale by sharing with third party reinsurers a proportion of the expected value of the loss 
distributions of risks underwritten. In contrast, non-proportional reinsurance helps reduce variance 
uncertainty only in the extreme tail of the expected loss distribution of insurance business (Eden 
and Kahane,1988). This makes setting reserves for retained low frequency but high magnitude 
losses difficult for insurance managers (actuaries) to establish with precision when non-proportional 
reinsurance predominates – as it often does in 'long-tail' lines of insurance, such as legal liability. As 
a result, we expect Proportional to be negatively related to the size of reserving errors (H4).  
Rein x Growth: As noted earlier, Harrington and Danzon (1994) suggest that managers of high 
premium 'growth opportunity' insurers can increase underwriting capacity, lower liquidity problems 
arising from 'new business strain', and alleviate the risk of insolvency resulting from new business 
growth by purchasing reinsurance, and thereby, reducing leverage (improving solvency). Therefore, 
as in H2, we predict that highly leveraged insurers experiencing new business growth will purchase 
more reinsurance, and so reduce loss reserves. As such, we include (mean-centred) interaction 
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terms in our estimations to capture the conjoint-effects of reinsurance and premium growth on loss 
reserves9.  
4.4.2.  Other treatment effects 
 Reinsurance can substitute for other risk management techniques, notably the use of 
derivatives instruments (Shiu, 2011). Therefore, we introduce two variables into our regression 
analysis to control for the effects of derivatives usage on loss reserving as follows:  
 Derivatives: Smith and Stulz (1985) find that the use of financial derivatives (i.e., forwards, 
futures, options and swaps)  reduces the variability of the future value of the firm, and so lowers 
the probability of incurring costs related to insolvency risk. Thus, all else equal, insurers that engage 
in derivatives hedging are expected to have lower incentives to manage their loss reserves. 
Following Shiu (2011), our Derivatives variable is labeled 1 for a derivative user, and 0 otherwise. 
 Rein x Deriv: Insurers can use both reinsurance and derivatives to manage their business 
risks (Shiu, 2011). We expect the interaction between reinsurance and derivatives lowers the 
volatility of insurers’ earnings, and so reduces the motives for insurers to manage their loss reserves 
to smooth their reported performance. Therefore, we introduce an interaction term between 
Reinsurance and Derivatives, which is normalised to reduce possible multicollinearity.  
4.5.  Firm-specific controls 
 As in previous studies (e.g., Petroni, 1992; Grace and Leverty, 2010, 2012), we also control 
for key firm-related variables that can impact on the reserving decisions of insurance firms. The 
firm-related variables that enter our analysis are briefly outlined and motivated below. 
Petroni, Ryan and Wahlen (2000) find the greater (lower) past average returns on assets 
(ROA), the greater the management incentives to smooth period income by over (under) estimating 
reserves in order to minimize potentially costly scrutiny by regulators, and others. ROA is defined as 
annual earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by the book value of total assets. Consistent 
with prior research (e.g.,Grace, 1990), we measure income smoothing as the average ROA over the 
past three years. We anticipate that insurers with on average larger ROA over the past three years 
are likely to under-estimate loss reserves. In addition, increased variability in earnings could 
increase the incidence and magnitude of reserving errors. Therefore, we include the standard 
deviation of an insurer’s ROA (Std_ROA) over the past five years as a control variable. Adiel (1996) 
reports that over-reserving can reduce (or postpone) period taxes (by reducing reported earnings), 
while under-reserving can have the opposite effect (by increasing reported earnings). Petroni and 
Shackelford (1999) note that in the US, insurers often shift premiums and losses across states and 
between accounting periods in order to reduce tax liabilities. Grace (1990) further argues that 
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insurers inflate reserves for future losses as their taxable income increases. As a result, we expect 
Tax Shield to be positively related to over-reserving. As in Grace (1990), we measure Tax Shield  as: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
. (12) 
  Petroni and Beasley (1996) observe that insurers writing long-tail insurance (e.g., legal 
liability) tend to have greater reserving errors than other insurers. This is due to the difficulty of 
accurately estimating the probability, quantum, and timing of insurance claims. Therefore, a 
variable for insurer’s participation in long-tailed lines of business (Long-Tail) enters our analysis, and 
is defined as the proportion of annual net (of reinsurance) premiums written on long-tail insurance 
to total annual net premiums written. Mayers and Smith (1990) suggest that, all else equal, insurers 
with a more diversified product mix are likely to be better able to diversify business risks and so less 
prone to reserve errors than more specialist insurers. Accordingly, a control variable representing 
an insurer's range of products (Product Mix) is included in our analysis. This variable is measured by 
a Herfindahl concentration index (equation 13) that is computed from the five main lines of 
insurance sold in the UK's property-casualty insurance market.10  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (
𝐷𝑃𝑊𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑃𝑊𝑖,𝑡
)
2
,
5
𝑙=1
 (13) 
where DPWl is the amount of direct premium written in the lth line of insurance and TPW is the 
amount of total premium written across property and liability lines by an insurer i in year t. The 
closer the Herfindahl index is to one, the more concentrated the production function of insurance 
firms implying a positive relation with the accuracy of loss reserves.  
 We identify organizational structure in our estimation using two variables. The first variable 
- Group - is a binary variable that equals 1 if an insurer is affiliated to a conglomerate group and 0 
otherwise.  Grace and Leverty (2012) argue that group insurers can draw on a ‘deep pool’ of 
actuarial and underwriting expertise in order to reduce the incidence of reserving error. This implies 
an inverse relation between group status and the magnitude of loss reserve errors. The second 
organizational structure variable - Public - is also a binary variable equal to 1 if an insurer is publicly 
quoted on a major stock market (e.g., London), and 0 otherwise. Public and private firms potentially 
face different demands for accounting information, with publicly quoted insurers likely to be 
associated with higher reporting quality (i.e., reduce loss reserve errors) in order to attract and 
assure market investors. The duration that an insurer has operated in the UK may also affect the 
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accuracy of loss reserves. For example, well-established insurers are likely to have better loss 
experience data, and therefore, produce more accurate loss reserves. We define firm age (Age) as 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since an insurer was established in the UK. In addition, 
relative to large entities, small insurance firms are likely to be inefficient at diversifying risk and 
more prone to making reserving errors (e.g., because of an absence of in-house actuarial expertise). 
This implies an inverse relation between the accuracy of loss reserves (per unit of insurance) and 
firm size. To avoid possible co-linearity between Firm Size and Product mix, we use the residual of 
firm size (Residual of Size) in our main analysis. Residual of Size is measured by standardized 
residuals obtained by regressing Firm Size with Product Mix.  
5.  Empirical results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
 Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistics for the variables used in our study. Table 1 
indicates that the mean loss reserve is over-estimated by 1.4% of total assets according to the KFS 
error and 2% with the Weiss error, indicating that on average, the insurers in our dataset tended to 
over-reserve between 1991 and 2005. In Table 1, the mean of Leverage(1) is 0.703, indicating that 
on average, the value of insurers' total claims liabilities are about 70% of total assets. The mean 
Leverage(2) ratio is 1.5, showing that for the average insurer net premiums written exceed  capital 
and surplus by 150%. On average, our sample of UK insurers cede just over a quarter of their annual 
gross premiums to reinsurance firms (Reinsurance), while only around 12% of our sample insurers 
use derivatives due to regulatory controls that seek to prevent speculation and ensure continued 
solvency (Derivatives). Proportional reinsurance, at an average of approximately 11% of total 
reinsurance ceded, is small compared with the use of non-proportional reinsurance. This indicates 
the relative importance of non-proportional reinsurance in covering tail-end losses and maintaining 
underwriting capacity and financial viability in property-casualty insurance (Weiss and Chung, 2004). 
More than 25% of our panel sample observations have policies written in a single line of insurance 
business (Product Mix = 1). Over 88% of the insurers in our data set are affiliated with a corporate 
group, and approximately 13% are publicly listed on a major stock exchange, such as London. The 
mean (median) age of insurer in the sample is 43 years (34 years). The average company size in 
terms of total assets held is £633 million. However, the median total assets size is significantly lower 
(i.e., £90.7 million), showing that the sample is skewed towards larger insurance firms (with the 
largest insurer in the panel sample reporting total assets of approximately £4.5 billion in 2005).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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 Table 2 gives the means and standard deviations for reserve errors (KFS and Weiss scaled by 
total assets) broken down by the levels of the key explanatory variables. Table 2 also reports the F-
statistics of the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-test and 𝜒2-statistics of Kruskal-Wallis test. 
We find only modest statistical evidence (p≤ 0.10, two-tailed) that average loss reserving errors 
differ across different quartiles of Leverage(1). We further note that insurer-year observations with 
the highest Leverage(1) value (1 - surplus-to-asset ratio) (4th quartile) have on average smallest loss 
reserve errors. However, the standard deviation of reserve errors in the highest quartile of 
Leverage(1) is large indicating that some high-leverage insurers over-reserve, while others under-
reserve their claims liabilities. The 𝜒2 statistics given in Table 2 also show that insurers with the 
highest and the lowest Leverage(2) (Q1 and Q4) have on average smallest reserving errors. 
Therefore, to gain better insights on the relation between insurers’ leverage risk and reserve errors, 
regressions that distinguish the relative magnitude of positive and negative reserve errors are 
performed, and reported in Tables 5 and 6. Additionally, both the F-statistics and 𝜒2 statistics given 
in Table 2 indicate that the mean reserve errors significantly differ across quartiles of the 
Reinsurance distribution.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
5.2.   Multivariate analysis  
 Tables 3 and 4 relate to H1A and H1B and show the results of the fixed-effects logistic 
regression analysis (equation (3)) with regard to the direction (sign) of (KFS/Weiss) reserving errors 
with respect to leverage. As the fixed-effects logistic model requires the dependent variable to be 
time variant, insurers that continuously over-reserved or under-reserved in every year during the 
period of analysis were eliminated in our multivariate tests. This gives a final sample of 1,034 firm-
year observations (n = 108 insurance firms) for KFS errors and 964 firm-year observations (n=103 
insurance firms) for Weiss errors.  
 Consistent with H1A (and with the logistic dependent variable in equation 3 set to 1 in cases 
of under-reserving, and 0 otherwise), the positive estimated coefficients reported in Tables 3 and 4 
indicate that insurers with higher leverage (as measured by 1-suplus/asset ratio (Leverage(1)) 
and/or premium/surplus ratio (Leverage(2)) are more likely to under-estimate their loss reserves 
(at p<0.10, two-tailed). However, in practical terms the under-estimate only amounts  to about 1% 
of the book value of reserves11. However, the statistically significant (at p<0.10, two-tailed), but 
negatively signed coefficient estimates for the squared leverage proxies in Tables 3 and 4 reveal 
that, as predicted by H1B, when leverage levels get close to breaching statutory minimum levels of 
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solvency, insurers will over-reserve in anticipation of, or in response to, regulatory enforcement 
notices. This is a novel finding and suggests that the managers of UK insurance firms are likely to be 
mindful of preventing regulatory intervention and the probability of ruin. In line with H2, we further 
find that highly reinsured/high premium growth insurers (Rein x Growth) are more likely to report 
low loss reserves (at p<0.10, two-tailed).  
 Turning to our firm-related control variables, we obtain statistically significant (at p<0.01, 
two-tailed) and positive coefficient estimates with regard to the growth in the three-year average 
ROA, leading to a greater likelihood of under-reserving. This suggests that the bigger average past 
levels of ROA, the more managers are motivated to under-reserve in order to meet financial (e.g., 
earnings) targets (at p<0.05, two-tailed). We also find evidence (at p<0.01, two-tailed) that insurers 
with more variable past performance (Std_ROA) and higher taxable income (Tax Shield) are more 
likely to over-reserve - for example, to mitigate the potential liquidity constraints arising from 
increased market volatility.  
     [Insert Tables 3 & 4 here] 
 To examine the effects of insurers’ leverage on the level of over/under-reserving errors 
implied by H1A and H1B, we estimate a GMM-SYS model (equation 6) with the dependent variables 
KFS and Weiss errors scaled by total assets. The results are given in Tables 5 and 6, with the 
appropriate diagnostics (e.g.,  Hansen's (1982) J-test), also conducted.   
[Insert Tables 5 & 6 here] 
 Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that the coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable 
are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed), in the KFS and Weiss error regressions. 
This observation accords with the study of Beaver and McNichols (1998), and suggests that reserve 
errors are positively influenced by the previous year’s reserving decisions. The coefficient estimates 
for both of our leverage measures (Leverage(1) and Leverage(2) are negative in levels, and positive 
in the squared transformations with both KFS and Weiss reserve errors (at p<0.10, or lower, two-
tailed). These results further suggest that as leverage increases, insurers tend to under-reserve their 
liabilities as demonstrated in prior US research (e.g., Petroni, 1992). However, when the ratio of 
claims liabilities to total assets exceeds about 90%, and so threatens statutory solvency targets, 
insurers will over-reserve. From Tables 5 and 6, we also observe a negative, but statistically 
significant relation between Rein x Growth and reserving errors (at p< 0.10, two-tailed). Again 
consistent with H2, this result implies that insurers generating high premiums under-reserve and 
purchase reinsurance to limit the risk of unexpectedly high claims arising from a rapid growth in 
new business. 
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 Next, we employ equation 8 to test H3 and H4 on the relation between reinsurance and the 
accuracy of reserves. The coefficient estimates for the absolute magnitude of the KFS reserve error 
are shown in Table 7, with the corresponding results for the Weiss reserve error given in Table 8. 
Positive coefficient estimates indicate large loss reserve errors, while negative estimates reflect 
smaller errors.    
[Insert Tables 7 & 8 here] 
 Tables 7 and 8 show that the coefficient estimates for Leverage(1) are generally positive and 
statistically significant, implying a propensity for highly levered insurers to greatly under-estimate 
loss reserves (at p≤0.10, or two-tailed). In contrast, the coefficient estimates for the squared form 
of Leverage(1) are generally negative and significant, suggesting less of a tendency to substantially 
under-state loss reserves (at p≤0.05, two-tailed). These observations for Leverage(1) accord with  
H1A and H1B though the comparative results for Leverage(2) are less clear cut. The coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term Rein x Growth is positive and statistically significant with negative 
(smaller) KFS and Weiss errors (at p≤0.05, two-tailed), in line with H2.  
 The estimated coefficients for Reinsurance are negative and statistically significant with 
positive (large) reserving errors in all KFS and Weiss regressions presented in Tables 7 and 8 (at p < 
0.10 or better, two-tailed). These results support H3, and the view that highly reinsured insurers 
have a lower incidence of reserving errors than insurers that purchase less reinsurance. Prior 
research (e.g.,  Browne et al., 2012) suggests that more accurate loss reserves result from a 
reduction in information asymmetries. In mitigating market imperfections, reinsurers can play an 
important role as effective monitors of primary insurers’ financial and risk management systems. 
Furthermore, reinsurance enables primary insurers to retain smaller and more predictable risks and 
reinsure larger, but less predictable exposures as well as benefit from the risk management advice 
of reinsurance partners (Browne et al., 2012). These attributes help reduce the uncertainty of future 
claims liabilities, and enable insurers to more accurately estimate loss reserves. However, the 
results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that contrary to H4, the use of proportional reinsurance by UK 
insurers does not significantly affect reserving accuracy. This could, however, reflect the lower 
incidence of proportional risk reinsurance treaties in property-casualty insurance compared with 
the life insurance sector (e.g., see Winton, 1995). 
 In subsidiary tests, we also investigate the potential substitutive effect of derivatives use on 
loss reserving errors. However, none of the coefficient estimates for Derivatives are statistically 
significant. Additionally, in all regressions, the coefficient estimates for the interaction term Rein x 
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Deriv are not statistically significant, suggesting that as a risk management tool only reinsurance is 
effective in reducing reserving errors. Indeed, and as we noted earlier, in order to minimise the risk 
of financial distress and/or bankruptcy the use of derivatives by UK insurance firms is also strictly 
controlled by regulation. 
 Consistent with prior US-based research (e.g., Grace, 1990; Petroni, 1992; Beaver and 
McNichols, 1998), Tables 7 and 8 indicate that ROA is positive and  statistically significant with 
under-reserving errors, and negative and significant with over-reserving errors (at p≤0.10, two 
tailed) in the KFS and Weiss error analyses. These results imply that insurers with higher than 
average ROA over the past three years, under-state loss reserves. Additionally, Std_ROA is also 
positively related to over-estimated loss reserves. This accords with our expectation that volatile 
business performance increases uncertainty of future losses, and therefore, results in large 
reserving errors. The coefficient estimates for Tax Shield are negatively significant (at p≤0.10, two-
tailed), indicating that UK insurers with on average higher taxable income tend to have a low degree 
of under-reserving error.   
 All our regression models control for pre-defined firm-specific variables and time-effects. In 
summary, Tables 7 and 8 indicate that insurers operating within group structures (Group) are more 
likely to under-reserve than insurers that are not members of a corporate group. A possible 
explanation for this observation is that conglomerate insurers have better access to internal and 
external sources of capital, which enable them to under-estimate reserves without generating 
regulatory concern. As expected, we find that public insurers (Public) and insurers operating longer 
in the UK market (Age) more accurately estimate their loss reserves - for example, due to their 
greater risk management expertise and longer loss experience records. Additionally, bigger and 
more product-diversified insurers tend to have less reserving errors than smaller and niche product 
insurers. This suggests that larger diversified insurers can afford investing in the risk management 
expertise necessary to reduce the incidence and magnitude of reserving errors across their 
underwriting portfolios. Finally, our results show that insurers specialising in long-tail business 
(Long-Tail) (e.g., legal liability) have smaller positive errors than insurers that write shorter-tail 
insurance business. This finding is inconsistent with our expectations and prior US findings; but it 
might suggest that long-tail insurance providers have segment-specific risk knowledge that helps 
them to mitigate loss reserve errors to a greater extent than insurers that write mainly short-tail 
(e.g., motor) insurance business. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 Using 1991 to 2005 firm-level panel data drawn from the UK's property-casualty insurance 
industry, this study examines the relation between loss reserving errors, insurers’ leverage and 
reinsurance. We find that insurers with poor financial performance under-estimate reserves to 
potentially reduce leverage, and so pre-empt costly regulatory scrutiny. However, when leverage 
levels reach very high levels (i.e., where the value of claims to total assets exceeds about 90%), 
insurers over-reserve for future liabilities, indicating for the first time a non-linear relation between 
leverage and reserving policy. This suggests that the managers of insurance firms treat 
precautionary reserving as a high priority strategic issue in the face of potentially large and uncertain 
future losses, and costly regulatory intervention. In this regard, our results provide some comfort to 
policyholders, industry regulators, and others (e.g., credit ratings agencies) that have a direct 
interest in monitoring the adequacy of solvency management in UK insurance firms - an attribute is 
likely to be particularly important under the 2016 capital rules for European insurers - Solvency II.  
 We also investigate whether monitoring by reinsurers reduces reserving errors in highly 
reinsured insurers and find that consistent with prior research (e.g., Adiel, 1996), heavily reinsured 
insurers are less likely to manipulate loss reserves. This observation suggests that reinsurers play 
important monitoring and advisory roles in influencing solvency and other financial policies (e.g., 
earnings management) of primary insurers - a commercial and policy function that helps underpin 
the maintenance of statutory minimum levels of solvency, and facilitate effective regulatory control. 
However, we do not find evidence to support the view that insurers that predominantly use 
proportional reinsurance report more accurate reserving errors. Further, we do not find that 
derivatives hedging affects the accuracy of loss reserves. Finally, by contributing new insights into 
the inter-relation between strategic risk management decisions (e.g., reinsurance) and discretionary 
accounting accruals, the present study could help scholars, accounting standard-setters, insurance 
industry regulators, and others to conduct financial analyses in other industrial contexts.  
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Notes 
1 Purnanandam's (2008) suggests that the risk to investors of financial distress/bankruptcy increases when corporate 
debt-to-asset ratios reach about 90% - i.e., 'at very high' leverage levels. Our analysis also indicated that across all lines 
of insurance business examined, over-reserving tended to increase when claims-to-asset ratios reached the 90% 
threshold. 
   
2 The insurance underwriting cycle begins after periods of large losses when premium rates rise thereby increasing 
profits, and attracting inflows of capital into the property-casualty insurance sector. Thereafter, excess capital induces 
price cutting in competitive insurance markets (Cummins and Danzon, 1997). 
 
3 From 1 April 2013 the statutory supervision and regulation of UK insurers has been conducted by the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA), whilst matters of insurance market operations are regulated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). The PRA is part of the Bank of England, and the FCA is an independent regulatory body which is 
accountable to HM Treasury. 
 
4 Unlike US insurers, which report using generally accepted insurance accounting principles (US GAAP), major UK 
insurance firms have since January 2005 reported their business activities in line with, International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) 4, which established changes in the accounting and financial reporting rules for UK and other European 
publicly listed insurers, including disclosure of reserve movements. However, IFRS 4 was only applicable towards the 
tail-end of our analysis period (1991 to 2005), and unlikely to significantly affect our analysis. Also, since 1 January 2015 
non-publicly listed UK (and Irish) insurers report under accounting standard FRS 103 - a standard that is largely 
consistent with IFRS 4.  
 
5 Public media sources are replete with reports that the UK insurance regulator has concerns about the release of prior 
years' reserves to meet short-term profit and dividend targets. For example, see the Financial Times article of 14 
November, 2014, 'Regulators to probe insurers over drawing down reserves'. Such regulatory unease often results in 
UK insurers being compelled to make reserve additions in order to meet statutory solvency targets and ease regulatory 
concerns about their future financial condition. 
 
6 The under-investment incentive is an agency cost of debt problem that relates to the risk, particularly in highly 
leveraged states, that shareholders may not reinstate productive assets following a severe loss event as the gains from 
reinstatement accrue to debtholders rather than themselves. In such a situation, shareholders may exercise their 
‘default' put option under limited liability and voluntarily liquidate the firm. However, Garven and MacMinn (1993) note 
that the under-investment problem can be mitigated by (re)insurance contracts in that the proceeds from (re)insurance 
claims can be used to reinstate impaired assets after unexpectedly severe losses, thereby, minimizing the risks (and 
costs) of financial distress and/or bankruptcy. 
 
7 Although proportional and non-proportional treaties are used across property and liability lines of business, non-
 proportional treaties are commonly used in catastrophe and liability lines of insurance (Winton, 1995). However, we 
 control for the possibility that choice of reinsurance treaty could be driven by line of business in our regression 
 analyses. 
 
8 To further test for multicollinearity we compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our independent variables. All VIF 
values are well below the benchmark value of 10, with the largest being 2.46 (e.g., see Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, bias 
due to multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic in this study.  
 
9Ai and Norton (2003) note that interpreting coefficient estimates on interactions can be problematic, especially in non-
linear (e.g., logistic) specifications, unless the mediating effect is estimated using consistent cross-differences that 
account for all model covariates. We thus used the standard cross-partial derivatives estimator to deal with this issue. 
 
10 The five main lines of business written in the UK's property-casualty insurance market are: personal accident & health, 
motor, property, legal liability, and miscellaneous & pecuniary insurance. 
 
11 This percentage is derived from multiplying the standard deviations for the KFS and Weiss under-reserving errors in 
Table 1 with the relevant coefficient estimates in Tables 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics, UK Property-Casualty Insurers, 1991-2005 
Variable  
 
Mean   
 
Median  
 Std. 
Dev.  
 1st 
Quart.  
 3rd 
Quart.  
 
Obs.  
KFS 0.014  0.009  0.085  -0.004  0.047  1386 
KFS (O) 0.044  0.027  0.047  0.008  0.067  959 
KFS (U) -0.056  -0.023  0.107  -0.061  -0.006  427 
Weiss 0.020  0.012  0.082  -0.001  0.052  1386 
Weiss (O) 0.047  0.028  0.052  0.008  0.072  1017 
Weiss (U) -0.059  -0.023  0.111  -0.060  -0.007  369 
Leverage(1) 0.703  0.748  0.175  0.605  0.829  1386 
Leverage(2) 1.535  1.378  1.123  0.623  2.201  1386 
Reinsurance 0.259  0.176  0.249  0.059  0.404  1386 
Proportional 0.111  0.100  0.054  0.011  0.010  1386 
Derivatives 0.120  0.000  0.326  0.000  0.000  1386 
Growth 0.174  0.055  1.022  -0.072  0.224  1386 
ROA 0.057  0.038  0.126  0.003  0.093  1386 
Std_ROA 0.108  0.043  0.760  0.025  0.078  1386 
Tax Shield 0.344  0.222  0.978  0.118  0.339  1386 
Long-Tail 0.107  0.008  0.203  0.000  0.111  1386 
Product Mix 0.651  0.606  0.286  0.384  1.000  1386 
Group 0.881  1.000  0.324  1.000  1.000  1386 
Public 0.128  0.000  0.335  0.000  0.000  1386 
Age 43.404  34.000  34.580  13.000  68.000  1386 
Total Assets 
(mln. £) 633.323  90.676  1,665.047  230.030  439.705  1386 
This table reports the summary statistics for the years 1991 to 2005. KFS error is defined as the difference between the incurred 
losses in the current period and a revised estimate five years in the future. Weiss error is the difference between the incurred losses 
in the current period and the developed losses paid five years in the future. Both errors are scaled by total assets. Positive (O) reserve 
errors indicate that the insurer initially over-reserved, while negative reserve errors (U) indicate under-reserving. Leverage(1) is 1 - 
surplus-to-asset ratio; Leverage(2) is a net premium-to-surplus ratio; Reinsurance is the ratio of gross premium written ceded to 
reinsurer; Proportional – proportion of gross premium ceded under proportional reinsurance cover; Derivatives = 1 for a derivative 
user (i.e., an insurer has non-zero year-end derivative position or if derivatives are open at the end of the previous year) and 0 for a 
nonuser; Growth is the ratio one-year increase in net premium written; Long-Tail is the ratio of losses incurred in long-tail lines of 
insurance; ROA is measured as average returns on assets over the period of past three years; Std_ROA is measured as standard 
deviation of ROA over the period of past five years; Tax Shield is the sum of net income and estimated reserves divided by the total 
admitted assets; Product Mix is the line of business Herfindahl index, which measures an insurer’s product diversification; Long-Tail 
is defined as the share of annual net premiums written on liability insurance to total annual premiums written; Group is an indicator 
variable for insurers that are associated with a group; Public is dummy variable equal to 1 if an insurer is publically quoted and 0 
otherwise; Age is the natural log of the number of years since the insurance firm was established in the UK.  
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of KFS and Weiss Reserve Errors by the Levels of Hypothesised Variables, UK Property-
Casualty Insurers, 1991-2005 
Group Variable On 
KFS Weiss 
 Mean    S.D..  F-test 𝜒2-test  Mean    S.D.  F-test 𝜒2-test 
Leverage(1): Q1 347 0.014 0.060 
 20.35 
 
40.39 
  0.019 0.066 
10.66 
  
60.9 
  
Leverage(1): Q2 346 0.013 0.067    0.018 0.064     
Leverage(1): Q3 347 0.022 0.075    0.028 0.076     
Leverage(1): Q4 346 0.005 0.123 *  0.015 0.113  * 
                       
Leverage(2): Q1  346 0.008 0.073 
1.11 
 
18.3 
  0.016 0.073 
10.00 
  
17.1 
  
Leverage(2): Q2 347 0.017 0.075    0.023 0.075     
Leverage(2): Q3 346 0.018 0.104    0.025 0.097     
Leverage(2): Q4 347 0.011 0.084  *** 0.017 0.082  *** 
                       
Reinsurance: Q1  346 0.023 0.067 
 50.97 
 
13.26 
  0.027 0.072 
50.40 
  
15.6 
  
Reinsurance: Q2 347 0.021 0.087    0.028 0.088     
Reinsurance: Q3  346 0.012 0.089    0.019 0.083     
Reinsurance: Q4  347 -0.001 0.093 *** *** 0.006 0.083 *** *** 
                       
Proportional: > 0 344 0.011 0.076 
 00.57 
 
00.64 
  0.018 0.076 
00.43 
  
00.00 
  
Proportional: = 0 1042 0.015 0.088   0.021 0.084   
                       
Derivatives: = 1 167 0.024 0.054 
 0.13 
 
10.2 
  0.031 0.057 
3.28 
  
12.59 
  
Derivatives: = 0 1219 0.012 0.088 * *** 0.019 0.085 * *** 
                       
Rein x Growth: Q1  346 0.002 0.094 
 30.53 
 
11.8 
  0.011 0.091 
20.75 
  
10.7 
  
Rein x Growth: Q2 347 0.021 0.071    0.026 0.070     
Rein x Growth: Q3  346 0.019 0.090    0.026 0.084     
Rein x Growth: Q4  347 0.012 0.082 ** *** 0.018 0.081 ** ** 
This table reports the means and standard deviations of KFS and Weiss errors (scaled by total assets) broken down by the levels of 
the main explanatory variables. Leverage(1) is 1 - surplus-to-asset ratio; Leverage is a net premium-to-surplus ratio; Reinsurance is 
the ratio of gross premium written ceded to reinsurer; Proportional – proportion of gross premium ceded under proportional 
reinsurance cover; Derivatives = 1 for a derivative user (i.e., an insurer has non-zero year-end derivative position or if derivatives are 
open at the end of the previous year) and 0 for a non-user; Rein x Growth is an interaction term between Reinsurance and Growth; 
Growth is the ratio one-year increase in net premium written.  Q1-Q4 represents 1st - 4th quartiles of the distribution. The F-statistics 
of the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 𝜒2-statistics of the Kruskal-Wallis test are used to examine whether the means of 
loss reserve errors differ significantly across levels of leverage and reinsurance in two-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 3 
Logistic Regression of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance Market 
1991 to 2005: Leverage - Sign of KFS Reserve Errors 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Leverage(1) 2.662 * 1.481   2.730 * 0.165    -    - 
Leverage(1)^2 -2.473 * 1.489  -2.531 * 1.482    
Leverage(2)             0.069 * 0.040 
Leverage(2)^2       -0.012 * 0.007 
Reinsurance -0.235  0.274   -0.211  0.277   -0.030  0.275 
Derivatives -0.144  0.227   -0.143  0.227   -0.109  0.227 
Rein x Growth      
  0.351 * 0.201        
Growth 0.019  0.056   0.016  0.064   0.008  0.056 
ROA 1.875 *** 0.641   1.952 *** 0.662   2.090 *** 0.616 
Std_ROA -0.226 ** 0.094   -0.223 ** 0.100   -0.239 ** 0.094 
Tax Shield -0.620 *** 0.214   -0.623 *** 0.216   -0.613 *** 0.214 
Long-Tail 0.145  0.305   0.137  0.305   0.204  0.305 
Product Mix 0.161  0.245   0.182  0.245   0.152  0.238 
Public -0.886 *** 0.222   -0.866 *** 0.220   -0.882 *** 0.221 
Age 0.021  0.060   0.018  0.060   0.018  0.061 
Resid_Size -0.033  0.044   -0.036  0.044   -0.025  0.042 
Time-effects Yes       Yes       Yes     
Wald 𝜒2 83.73 ***   133.32 ***     107.19 
*
*
*   
Log L -414.6      -413.3      -415.5    
No. of observations 1034      1034      1034    
No. of groups 108      108      108    
This table reports the results of the fixed-effects logistic (leverage/error direction) regressions (equations 3). The dependent variable 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if KFS reserve error is negative, and 0 otherwise. All remaining variables are defined as in the text. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Logistic Regression of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance Market 
1991 to 2005: Leverage - Sign of Weiss Reserve Errors 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable Coef.   S.E.   Coef.   S.E.   Coef.   S.E. 
Leverage(1) 0.282 * 0.101   0.407 * 0.243         
Leverage(1)^2  -0.889 *  0.512   -1.009  *  0.535   0.126 * 0.076 
Leverage(2)       -0.075 * 0.037 
Leverage(2)^2         
Reinsurance -0.389  0.283   -0.369  0.286   -0.027  0.030 
Derivatives -0.213  0.258   -0.211  0.258   -0.196  0.257 
Rein x Growth         0.494 * 0.302         
Growth 0.047  0.056   0.053  0.071   0.038  0.056 
ROA 1.742 *** 0.624   1.820 *** 0.649   2.024 *** 0.627 
Std_ROA -0.174 ** 0.076   -0.167 ** 0.080   -0.178 ** 0.078 
Tax Shield -0.611 *** 0.208   -0.615 *** 0.210   -0.591 *** 0.206 
Long-Tail -0.232  0.333   -0.239  0.332   -0.131  0.337 
Product Mix 0.601 ** 0.257   0.634 ** 0.258   0.542 ** 0.252 
Public -1.105 *** 0.261   -1.071 *** 0.257   -1.079 *** 0.260 
Age 0.027  0.062   0.025  0.062   0.027  0.062 
Resid_Size -0.102 ** 0.045   -0.106 ** 0.045   -0.085 * 0.043 
Time-effects Yes       Yes       Yes     
Wald 𝜒2 73.28 ***   77.65 ***     55.32 ***   
Log L -374.94      -372.02      -375.3    
No. of observations 964      964      964    
No. of groups 103      103      103    
This table reports the results of the fixed-effects logistic (leverage/error direction) regressions (equations 3). The dependent variable 
is the dummy variable equal to 1 if Weiss reserve error is negative, and 0 otherwise. All remaining variables are defined as in the text. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
GMM-SYS Regression Test of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance 
Market 1991 to 2005: Leverage - Level of KFS Reserve Errors 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E. 
Intercept 0.148 * 0.085   0.146 * 0.089   0.051  0.038 
lagKFS 0.809 *** 0.100   0.808 *** 0.101   0.821 *** 0.098 
Leverage(1) -0.655 ** 0.325   -0.683 ** 0.332         
Leverage(1)^2 0.655 ** 0.276  0.651 ** 0.283    
Leverage(2)                -0.023 * 0.009 
Leverage(2)^2       0.006 * 0.003 
Reinsurance -0.038  0.026   -0.031  0.028   -0.038  0.026 
Derivatives -0.018 * 0.010   -0.017 * 0.009   -0.024 * 0.013 
Rein x Growth         -0.034 * 0.019         
Growth -0.003  0.005   -0.004  0.005   -0.008  0.007 
ROA -0.080 * 0.043   -0.072 * 0.040   -0.134 * 0.082 
Std_ROA 0.003 * 0.002   0.003 * 0.002   0.023 * 0.013 
Tax Shield -0.001  0.003   -0.001  0.003   -0.001  0.003 
Long-Tail -0.002  0.044   -0.004  0.045   0.015  0.046 
Product Mix 0.007  0.017   0.013  0.020   -0.009  0.016 
Group -0.015 * 0.008   -0.017 ** 0.008   -0.015 * 0.008 
Public -0.005  0.010   -0.005  0.011   -0.007  0.009 
Age 0.002  0.003   0.003  0.003   -0.004  0.009 
Resid_Size 0.015 ** 0.007   0.015 ** 0.007   0.018 ** 0.007 
Time-effects Yes       Yes       Yes     
Sargan-Hansen  0.522       0.496       0.684     
Diff-Sargan-Hansen 0.448       0.457       0.873     
AR(1) 0.001       0.000       0.001     
AR(2) 0.886       0.959       0.867     
No. of observations 1226       1226       1226     
No. of groups 151       151       151     
No. of instruments 118       118       118     
This table reports the results of the KFS GMM-SYS (leverage/error level) regressions (equation 6). The dependent variable is the level 
of KFS over/under reserve error scaled by total assets. All remaining variables are defined as in the text. Asymptotically robust 
standard errors are reported. Lagged levels (dated t-2,…,t-10) in the first-difference equations, combined with lagged first-differences 
(dated t-1) in the level equations, are used as instruments. The values reported for the Hansen J- test are the p-values for the null 
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The Difference Sargan-Hansen test gives the p-values for the validity of the additional 
moment restrictions required by the GMM-SYS estimator. Both of these tests do not reject the null hypotheses. AR(1) and AR(2) give 
the p-values for first-order and second-order auto-correlated disturbances in the first-difference equations. The null hypothesis is 
rejected for AR(1), but not AR(2), indicating that residuals are not correlated over time. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
GMM-SYS Regression Test of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance 
Market 1991 to 2005: Leverage - Level of Weiss Reserve Errors  
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef..  S.E.. 
Intercept 0.135 * 0.084   0.131 * 0.089   0.067  0.035 
lagWeiss 0.812 *** 0.078   0.811 *** 0.079   0.798 *** 0.078 
Leverage(1) -0.634 ** 0.320   -0.667 ** 0.331         
Leverage(1)^2 0.612 ** 0.275  0.653 ** 0.285    
Leverage(2)                -0.029 * 0.017 
Leverage(2)^2        0.006 * 0.003 
Reinsurance -0.039  0.026   -0.030  0.029   -0.052 * 0.027 
Derivatives -0.021 * 0.012   -0.021 * 0.012   -0.027 ** 0.013 
Rein x Growth         -0.046 * 0.027         
Growth -0.005  0.006   -0.006  0.006   -0.007  0.007 
ROA -0.120 ** 0.058   -0.130 ** 0.052   -0.200 * 0.098 
Std_ROA 0.022 * 0.011   0.026 ** 0.012   0.018 ** 0.008 
Tax Shield 0.002  0.003   0.002  0.003   0.003  0.003 
Long-Tail 0.005  0.038   0.003  0.038   0.023  0.041 
Product Mix 0.008  0.017   0.016  0.020   0.012  0.014 
Group -0.012 * 0.006   -0.014 * 0.008   -0.012 ** 0.005 
Public -0.004  0.010   -0.004  0.011   -0.006  0.008 
Age 0.002  0.003   0.003  0.003   -0.003  0.003 
Resid_Size 0.014 ** 0.006   0.014 ** 0.007   0.017 ** 0.007 
Time-effects Yes       Yes       Yes     
Sargan-Hansen 0.496       0.472       0.6671     
Diff-Sargan Hansen 0.152       0.289       0.509     
AR(1) 0.000       0.000       0.000     
AR(2) 0.912       0.904       0.787     
No. of observations 1226       1226       1226     
No. of groups 151       151       151     
No. of instruments 118       118       118     
This table reports the results of the Weiss GMM-SYS (error/level) regressions (equation 6). The dependent variable is the level of 
Weiss over/under reserve error scaled by total assets. All remaining variables are defined as in the text. Asymptotically robust 
standard errors are reported. Lagged levels (dated t-2,…,t-10) in the first-difference equations, combined with lagged first-differences 
(dated t-1) in the level equations, are used as instruments. The values reported for the Sargan-Hansen J-test are the p-values for the 
null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The Difference Sargan-Hansen test gives the p-values for the validity of the 
additional moment restrictions required by the GMM-SYS estimator. Both of these tests do not reject the null hypotheses.  AR(1) and 
AR(2) give the p-values for first-order and second-order auto-correlated disturbances in the first-difference equations. The null 
hypothesis is rejected for AR(1), but not AR(2), indicating that residuals are not correlated over time.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Regression Test of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance Market 1991 
to 2005: Reserve Accuracy - Absolute Magnitude of KFS Reserve Errors 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Variable Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.   S.E.   Coef.  S.E. 
Intercept -0.055  0.062 
  -0.050  0.059 
  -0.064  0.077 
  0.031  0.054   0.017  0.047 
lagKFS 0.817 *** 0.182   0.801 *** 0.186   0.802 *** 0.184   0.821 *** 0.1852   0.772 *** 0.171 
Over-Reserving 
Leverage(1) 0.231 * 0.192   0.255 * 0.175   0.268 * 0.233   0.158  0.169         
Leverage(1)^2  -0.126   0.159   -0.158    0.144    -0.162   0.184   -0.081  0.141     
Leverage(2)             0.013  0.018 
Leverage(2)^2             -0.041  0.047 
Reinsurance -0.052 ** 0.023   -0.071 *** 0.026   -0.051 ** 0.020   -0.040 * 0.025   -0.041 * 0.027 
Proportional                         0.176  0.135         
Derivatives -0.001  0.011   -0.005  0.011   -0.007  0.011   -0.006   0.009   -0.008  0.016 
Rein x Growth         -0.017  0.028                        
Rein x Deriv                 -0.004  0.008                 
Growth -0.008  0.007   -0.008  0.008   -0.008  0.007   -0.007  0.007   -0.011  0.010 
ROA -0.079 * 0.040   -0.066 * 0.041   -0.064 * 0.040   -0.051 * 0.029   -0.059 * 0.038 
Std_ROA 0.014 * 0.008   0.016 * 0.010   0.014 * 0.008   0.014 * 0.008   0.015 * 0.009 
Tax Shield -0.007  0.005   -0.007  0.005   -0.007  0.005   -0.006  0.005   -0.009  0.007 
Long-Tail -0.050 * 0.030   -0.058 * 0.035   -0.050 * 0.030   -0.048 * 0.029   -0.037 * 0.022 
Product Mix -0.027 * 0.015   -0.027 * 0.015   -0.028 * 0.016   -0.024 * 0.015   -0.025 * 0.015 
Group -0.021 ** 0.010   -0.019 * 0.011   -0.021 ** 0.011   -0.013 * 0.007   -0.013 * 0.007 
Public -0.012 * 0.006   -0.010 * 0.005   -0.013 * 0.007   -0.011 * 0.006   -0.004  0.007 
Age -0.006 * 0.004   -0.006 * 0.004   -0.006 * 0.003   -0.007 * 0.004   -0.003  0.003 
Resid_Size 0.002  0.006   0.002  0.007   0.003  0.006   0.002  0.006   0.002  0.007 
Under-Reserving 
Leverage(1) 0.740 * 0.401   0.777 ** 0.398   0.826 * 0.458   0.723 * 0.383     
Leverage(1)^2 -0.849 ** 0.396  -0.857 ** 0.393  -0.890 ** 0.442  -0.828 ** 0.377    
Leverage(2)                                 0.026 * 0.012 
Leverage(2)^2             -0.011 * 0.005 
Reinsurance -0.099 **  0.045   -0.077 * 0.046   -0.074  0.051   -0.100 * 0.043   0.051  0.057 
Proportional                      0.118   0.166        
Derivatives 0.005  0.032   0.001  0.033   0.007  0.028   0.006  0.034   -0.015  0.029 
Rein x Growth         0.167 ** 0.076                         
Rein x Deriv                 -0.006  0.016                 
Growth -0.008  0.023   -0.015  0.026   -0.010  0.023   -0.012  0.023   0.015  0.021 
ROA 0.097 * 0.058   0.080 * 0.051   0.094 * 0.057   0.086 * 0.051   0.129 * 0.069 
Std_ROA -0.001  0.002   -0.001  0.002   -0.001  0.003   -0.002  0.003   -0.002  0.003 
Tax Shield -0.024  0.024   -0.025  0.023   -0.025  0.025   -0.022  0.023   -0.005  0.015 
Long-Tail -0.016  0.047   -0.028  0.047   -0.021  0.051   -0.028  0.047   -0.094 * 0.050 
Product Mix -0.042  0.033   -0.047  0.035   -0.048  0.032   -0.047  0.033   -0.035  0.024 
Group 0.113 ** 0.051   0.101 ** 0.045   0.103 ** 0.047   0.104 ** 0.047   0.043 * 0.024 
Public -0.001  0.025   0.004  0.024   -0.004  0.025   -0.003  0.023   -0.011  0.016 
Age -0.013 * 0.007   -0.017 *** 0.006   -0.015 ** 0.008   -0.015 ** 0.007   -0.014 ** 0.006 
Resid_Size 0.008  0.008   0.008  0.008   0.009  0.007   0.008  0.007   0.002  0.007 
Time Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sargan-Hansen 0.317   0.657   0.207   0.497   0.484 
Diff Sargan-Hansen 0.188   0.268   0.570   0.668   0.388 
AR(1) 0.004   0.004   0.004   0.003   0.004 
AR(2) 0.762   0.743   0.811   0.761   0.678 
No. of observations 1226   1226   1226   1226   1226 
No. of groups 151   151   151   151   151 
No. of instruments 136   148   148   148   136 
This table reports the results of the KFS GMM-SYS (reserve accuracy) regressions (equation 8). The dependent variable is the absolute 
value of KFS reserve error scaled by total assets. All remaining variables are as in the text. Asymptotically robust standard errors are 
reported. Lagged levels (dated t-2,…, t-6) in the first-difference equations, combined with lagged first-differences (dated t-1) in the 
level equations, are used as instruments. The values reported for the Sargan-Hansen J-test are the p-values for the null hypothesis 
of the validity of the instruments. The Difference Sargan-Hansen test gives the p-values for the validity of the additional moment 
restrictions required by the GMM-SYS estimator Both of these tests do not reject the null hypotheses. AR(1) and AR(2) give the p-
values for first-order and second-order auto-correlated disturbances in the first-difference equations. The null hypothesis is rejected  
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for AR(1), but not AR(2), indicating that residuals are not correlated over time. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Regression Test of Discretionary Reserving Behaviour in UK Property-Casualty Insurance Market 1991 
to 2005: Reserve Accuracy - Absolute Magnitude of Weiss Reserve Errors 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Variable Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.  S.E.   Coef.   S.E.   Coef.  S.E. 
Intercept -0.053  0.074 
  -0.054  0.064 
  -0.052  0.077 
  -0.041  0.069  0.034  0.037 
lagWeiss 0.711 *** 0.153   0.693 *** 0.154   0.681 *** 0.153   0.702 *** 0.153  0.647 *** 0.149 
Over-Reserving 
Leverage(1) 0.363 * 0.258   0.378 * 0.219   0.296 * 0.265   0.333 * 0.233        
Leverage(1)^2 -0.225  0.219  -0.246  0.181  -0.173  0.225 -0.205  0.197     
Leverage(2)                               -0.004  0.015 
Leverage(2)^2               0.005  0.004 
Reinsurance -0.053 ** 0.026   -0.053 ** 0.024   -0.057 ** 0.025   -0.056 ** 0.026  -0.032 * 0.014 
Proportional                         -0.005  0.119        
Derivatives -0.009  0.013   -0.008  0.011   -0.015  0.012   -0.008   0.011  -0.003  0.015 
Rein x Growth         0.007  0.021                        
Rein x Deriv                 0.003  0.007                 
Growth -0.021 ** 0.011   -0.017 * 0.009   -0.020 ** 0.010   -0.021 ** 0.010  -0.022 ** 0.011 
ROA -0.122 * 0.072   -0.116 * 0.065   -0.099 * 0.060   -0.122 * 0.068  -0.080 * 0.048 
Std_ROA 0.030 ** 0.013   0.025 ** 0.012   0.028 ** 0.012   0.030 ** 0.013  0.028 ** 0.011 
Tax Shield -0.002  0.004   -0.002  0.004   -0.001  0.004   -0.002  0.004  -0.004  0.004 
Long-Tail -0.054 * 0.030   -0.050 * 0.030   -0.060 * 0.032   -0.060 * 0.033  -0.048 * 0.030 
Product Mix -0.024 * 0.014   -0.026 * 0.015   -0.031 ** 0.015   -0.025 * 0.014  -0.021 * 0.010 
Group -0.014 * 0.008   -0.012 * 0.007   -0.013 * 0.007   -0.014 * 0.007  -0.006  0.009 
Public -0.014 * 0.008   -0.012 * 0.007   -0.014 * 0.007   -0.015 ** 0.008  -0.005  0.007 
Age -0.003  0.003   -0.002  0.003   -0.002  0.003   -0.002  0.003  -0.001  0.003 
Resid_Size 0.001  0.006   0.001  0.006   0.003  0.006   0.002  0.005  0.001  0.006 
Under-Reserving 
Leverage(1) 0.775 ** 0.439   0.790 ** 0.403   0.780 ** 0.450   0.724 ** 0.411        
Leverage(1)^2  -0.941 **  0.444    -0.900  **  0.419    -0.898 **   0.443    -0.883 **   0.413    
Leverage(2)            0.046 * 0.022 
Leverage(2)^2            -0.015 * 0.008 
Reinsurance -0.118 ** 0.055   -0.063  0.058   -0.062  0.052   -0.108 ** 0.052  -0.047  0.047 
Proportional                      0.048   0.134       
Derivatives 0.030  0.040   0.023  0.036   0.017  0.032   0.014  0.037  0.005  0.028 
Rein x Growth         0.192 ** 0.096                         
Rein x Deriv                 -0.013  0.017                 
Growth -0.007  0.026   -0.020  0.028   -0.015  0.024   -0.006  0.025  0.021  0.027 
ROA 0.092 * 0.061   0.075 * 0.045   0.080 * 0.047   0.088 * 0.048  0.140 * 0.079 
Std_ROA -0.003   0.003   -0.002   0.003   -0.002   0.003   -0.002  0.003  -0.002   0.003 
Tax Shield -0.093 * 0.050   -0.102 ** 0.047   -0.091 * 0.050   -0.087 * 0.050  -0.054   0.038 
Long-Tail 0.042   0.066   0.037   0.058   0.023   0.066   0.032  0.065  -0.068   0.066 
Product Mix -0.028   0.038   -0.033   0.039   -0.040   0.036   -0.027  0.036  -0.033   0.027 
Group 0.077 ** 0.038   0.071 ** 0.035   0.062 * 0.034   0.073 ** 0.035  0.033 * 0.019 
Public 0.007  0.039   0.010  0.037   0.001  0.037   0.005  0.037  -0.013  0.017 
Age -0.020 *** 0.008   -0.018 *** 0.007   -0.020 *** 0.008   -0.021 *** 0.007  0.016 ** 0.006 
Resid_Size 0.013 * 0.007   0.010  0.008   0.013 * 0.007   0.011 * 0.007  0.004  0.007 
Time Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Hansen 0.275   0.225   0.289   0.234   0.315 
Diff-Hansen 0.448   0.301   0.340   0.216   0.394 
AR(1) 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.002 
AR(2) 0.923   0.875   0.931   0.949   0.350 
No. of observations 1226   1226   1226   1226   1226 
No. of groups 151   151   151   151   151 
No. of instruments 136   148   148   148   136 
 This table reports the results of the Weiss GMM-SYS (reserve accuracy) regressions (equation 8). The dependent variable is the 
absolute value of Weiss reserve error scaled by total assets. All remaining variables are defined as in the text. Asymptotically robust 
standard errors are reported. Lagged levels (dated t-2, …, t-6) in the first-difference equations, combined with lagged first-differences 
(dated t-1) in the level equations, are used as instruments. The values reported for the Hansen J-test are the p-values for the null 
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The Difference-Hansen test gives the p-values for the validity of the additional moment 
restrictions required by the GMM-SYS estimator. Both of these tests do not reject the null hypotheses. AR(1) and AR(2) give the p-
values for first-order and second-order auto-correlated disturbances in the first-difference equations. The null hypothesis is rejected  
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for AR(1), but not AR(2), indicating that residuals are not correlated over time.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
